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Abstract:  
This paper is the starting point of a two-year research project about the impact of Globo 
Television in Portugal. The research project will mainly expand on the issues covered in 
this paper. The aims of this paper are two-fold: firstly, to analyse the relevance of the 
Portuguese television market to Globo; secondly, to examine the importance of Globo's 
telenovelas in Portugal since the 1970's as well as the consequences of the recent 
transfer of Globo's capital and know-how to a newly created commercial television 
channel in Portugal, Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC). 
 
 
 
 
Crossing the Atlantic: 
Globo's Wager in Portugal 
 
 
Paper delivered to the Political Economy Section of the Scientific Conference of the 
International Association for Mass Communication Research, Oaxaca, Mexico, 2-7 July 
1997. 
Supremacy at Home 
 
'If we are speaking of television in Brazil, that necessarily 
means we are speaking of Globo' (Lima, 1990:35). 
Brazilian biggest television network, TV Globo, is one of the most interesting 
cases of so-called reverse cultural imperialism. As Sinclair et al. point out 'the irony is 
that Latin America, which was practically the cradle of the theorisation of cultural 
imperialism, is now the region with most spectacular examples undermining that theory' 
(1996:7). Indeed, Globo - run by the Marinho family - is today one of the most powerful 
multi-media groups. Though Roberto Marinho (in his 90s) built up a conglomerate of 
nearly 100 companies, in the communications arena the main enterprises are: Globo's 
own ten television stations and 68 affiliated stations; Globo's Radio network has 11 own 
stations and 15 affiliated; O Globo newspaper (the second largest paper in the country); 
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Globo News Agency; Globo Publishing; Sigla audio producer; Globo video and Globo 
films (Lima, 1990:36).  
According to João Roberto Marinho, Vice-president of Globo enterprises and 
the son of Roberto Marinho, 'the Globo network reaches today a potential market of 33 
million households with TV, and the network reaches 97% of the Brazilian territory' 
(interviewed by Mayblin, 1996:8). The TBI Yearbook 96 claims that TV Globo 
currently attracts 65% of the country's viewing audience. This figure is nevertheless 
disputed by João Roberto Marinho who states that the figure is 70% (Ibid.). The 
remainder 30% is divided between five national, privately run services - São Paulo 
based SBT, TV Manchete in Rio de Janeiro and the former regional stations TV Record, 
Bandeirantes, and CNT - and one publicly owned broadcaster. 
Literature about Globo often portraits it as being the world's fourth largest 
network in terms of audience size. The 'fourth largest in the world' which is still taken 
for granted was established when TV Globo won an international award in the US in 
1985. At that time research showed that Globo was the fourth biggest network in the 
world after the American NBC, ABC and CBS. Since then no research had been 
conducted to find out if that is still the case. But, in terms of audience size, things might 
have changed. 'Both India's and China's state TV network monopolies, for instance, now 
command audiences several times larger than Brazil's Globo network, not only because 
they are monopolies but also because of the sheer size of their respective population 
(Mayblin, 1996:9). 
Being or not the 'fourth largest in the world', Globo gets most of Brazil's 
US$3.9 billion expenditure a year in advertising (Kucinski, 1994:52). The Globo 
network absorbs about 80% of advertising for television and 60% of the total amount of 
money spent on advertising in the seventh largest advertising market in the world 
(Amaral and Guimarães, 1994:29). In the 1992 financial statement, the Roberto 
Marinho group declared just over US$2 billion net revenue (Kucinski, 1994:52). 
Globo's financial success is far from being the mere result of an entrepreneurial 
strategy. In fact, as Guimarães and Amaral point out, the broadcasting monopoly was 
not constructed on the margins of state, but in its shadow, with the support and 
protection of the successive military regimes. Its consolidation, however, took place 
under the patronage of the New Republic and the Collor government was key. After 
securing the private system with public investment and a technological infrastructure 
owned by the state, the military governments singled out one of the private systems, the 
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Globo network, as their favoured. The military's choice was confirmed by the next 
civilian government, even though this meant that the government would refrain from 
enforcing even the minimal existing regulatory legislation (1994:32). 
The relationship between the media business and national politics in Brazil 
could hardly be more intimate. Indeed, Roberto Marinho makes no excuse for 
supporting those in power given that without their permission, Globo could not operate 
in its present form. 'As long as the political power remains strong, we will show 
solidarity with it; if things change towards public opinion, we will change as well' 
(Marinho quoted in Diário de Lisboa, 30 July 1984). 
 
Going Beyond Brazil 
 
Having a strong position in the domestic market, Globo started considering the 
export of its cultural products, mainly telenovelas. In the 1970s, Globo's executives 
perceived the export of its products as a 'prestige factor' rather than as a revenue source. 
Given that telenovelas were made for the domestic market, its export implied practically 
no additional costs. Any extra-funds it could generate would be well received but, in the 
early stages of internationalisation, profits from the external market were expected to be 
kept low. 
At that time, two external markets stood up as the 'natural' markets for Globo's 
telenovelas: the Latin American market considering that most Latin American countries 
were at the time strong producers and consumers of the telenovela  genre, and the 
Portuguese market due to its cultural and linguistic proximity. 
The export to Latin American countries would be more demanding as it would 
involve promotion, distribution and the dubbing to Spanish. Apart from that, in Latin 
America, Globo already had a strong competitor in terms of production and distribution 
of telenovelas: the Mexican television network, Televisa. In contrast, Globo would not 
have any competitor in Portugal and there would be no need to make any linguistic 
adaptation. Therefore, Portugal became the first external market for Globo's telenovelas. 
In 1976, Globo sold Gabriela to the Portuguese Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) 
company, Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP). Its success was remarkable. 
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One year later, Globo set up an international division to support the export of 
telenovelas to Latin America. As expected, Globo's penetration in the Latin American 
market was not easy particularly due to Televisa's competition. But their strategy was 
very aggressive as an executive from the international division explained. 'To enter and 
win this market we had to face Televisa which produces 26 hours of Spanish 
programmes per day (...). Still we have been able to sell our products, adding dubbing 
costs, 50% cheaper than Televisa's. How? Using what I called 'drugs strategy': first you 
practically give, wait for success and later you sell for the best price' (quoted in Grael 
and Rocha, 1988:143). 
The telenovela's popularity in the Portuguese market made Globo's executives 
consider further expansion into the European market in the early 1980s. Globo started 
promoting its products in specialised international magazines. Presenting itself as 
'Globo TV Network of Brazil', the corporation was prepared to sell not only telenovelas 
but also mini-series, talk shows and sports programmes. Globo became a constant 
presence in international television festivals and markets (e.g.. Monte Carlo festival, 
London Multimedia market, NAPTE, organized by the National Associated TV 
Program Executives, in the US, etc.). Furthermore, Globo became highly competitive in 
terms of international televisions awards. These awards were important to promote the 
product (Grael and Rocha, 1988:143-4). 
Orders from Latin American countries were dealt with by the International 
Division in Rio de Janeiro. The New York office distributed Globo's products in the US 
and Canada while the Roma office received orders from Europe, with the exception of 
Portugal. RTP negotiated directly at board level in Globo's headquarters in Rio de 
Janeiro (Grael and Rocha, 1988:144). By the mid-1980's Globo not only retained its 
leading position in the Brazilian television market but it was exporting its cultural 
products to 128 countries (Melo, 1988:39). Globo's telenovelas, in particular, are 
galvanising audiences in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia. 
If the export of programmes was relatively risk-free, the same cannot be said 
about direct investment in a foreign company. In 1985, Globo exported, for the first 
time, capital to Europe, buying 90% of Telemontecarlo. The headquarters of the 
company was in Monte Carlo and its potential audience was in Italy and part of France. 
The initial investment was of US$9 million but additional capital was needed, among 
other things, to improve the reception of the television signal in Italy. 
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With the acquisition of Telemontecarlo, Globo expected to strengthen its 
position in the European market and 'to develop an European television network' 
(Louven quoted in Grael and Rocha, 1988:149). This was however a very unsuccessful 
venture and in 1994 Globo decided to sell its remaining shares. It is believed that Globo 
suffered huge losses with this undertaking, though the company has never revealed 
figures.  Amongst the reasons to leave Telemontecarlo, Globo mentions the European 
economic recession and the fall of the Italian lira in relation to the US dollar (Diário de 
Notícias, 16 January 1994). This failed investment had repercussion in Globo's future 
investment strategy. 
 
Gabriela: the Onset of 'Reverse' Dependency 
 
Portugal was indeed a 'natural' export market for Globo's products. Apart from 
the non-existence of a linguistic barrier, there has always been a strong cultural affinity 
between both countries. This means that popular television products in Brazil generally 
become popular in Portugal. 'The audience patterns in Brazil coincide with the audience 
patterns in Portugal. Furthermore, the preferences of the Portuguese people are getting 
closer and closer to those of the Brazilian people', says Geraldo Casé, artistic director of 
Globo's International Division (quoted in O Jornal, Suplemento, 20 May 1988). In both 
Lusophone countries,telenovelas are the most widely watched television programmes1. 
In the beginning however telenovelas were a truly difference product for the 
Portuguese public. Gabriela, Cravo e Canela, an adaptation of a Jorge Amado's novel, 
was the first telenovela to be broadcast in Portugal by the PSB company, RTP. The first 
episode went on the air on the 16th of May 1977 and soon became highly successful. 
People were actually changing their life style so they could watch the programme. This 
massive popularity was not foreseen and surprised the people involved in the process. 
'RTP was very conservative. With the exception of the BBC, no European channel was 
programming serials. So, I was hesitant in terms of introducing changes in prime time', 
states Carlos Cruz, RTP's Programme Director at the time (in Expresso, 17 May 1997). 
Indeed, it was Globo itself that first approached RTP with a proposal to acquire 
its products. Carlos Cruz says that he ended up doing the very first negotiation with 
                                                 
1Telenovelas are also the most widely watched television programmes in Portuguese speaking African 
countries. 
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Globo by mere accident. He happened to be in that position when Globo tried to sell 
Gabriela to RTP. Still, Carlos Cruz believes that the development of this relation was 
'inevitable' (in Expresso, 17 May 1997). Once the floodgate had been opened, Globo 
substantially intensified the export of telenovelas to RTP. O Casarão, Astro, Escrava 
Isaura  and  Dancin' Days  followed Gabriela, all beating audience records, with no 
competition either from other Brazilian TV networks or from Portuguese producers. 
From 1977 up until 1987, Globo sold 19 telenovelas to RTP2. After one decade 
of monopoly, Globo had to face competition from other Brazilian television networks. 
Manchete and Bandeirantes started exporting telenovelas and mini-series, though the 
vast majority of novelas continued to be Globo's products. Globo's telenovelas were 
perceived as being those with higher quality and the network had already strong links 
with RTP. 
On a comparatively smaller scale, Portuguese companies also started to 
produce telenovelas: in 1982, Edipim produced the first one, Vila Faia; in 1985 RTP 
produced Chuva na Areia; in 1987, Estúdios Atlântida produced Palavras Cruzadas. 
Overall, less than a dozen telenovelas were produced by Portuguese companies. Still, 
these 'domestic' products represent an effort to 'fight the ultra-dependency on Brazilian 
telenovelas', as Carneiro3 puts it (quoted in Sousa, 1996:210). Indeed, soon after the first 
Brazilian novelas were on the air, fears of 'reverse colonisation' have been expressed by 
the Portuguese cultural elites. The Portuguese telenovelas - in itself a repercussion of 
Brazilian telenovelas - were an attempt to counter-balance the Brazilian predominance. 
But, neither Portuguese telenovelas nor other Brazilian networks' telenovelas 
could effectively compete with Globo (Pantanal from Manchete being an exception). 
Globo increased considerably the export of novelas to RTP throughout the years. 
During the first decade, Globo was exporting an average of three per year while by 
1986/87 this figure had duplicated. Guaranteeing audiences, Globo's telenovelas 
became, in the 1990's, a trump card fiercely disputed between the traditional PSB 
company, RTP, and the newly created private TV channels, Sociedade Independente de 
Comunicação (SIC) and Televisão Independente (TVI)4. 
                                                 
2Gabriela, Casarão, Astro, Escrava Isaura, Dancin' Days, Sinhazinha Flô, Dona Xepa, Água Viva, Olhai 
os Lírios do Campo, Baila Comigo, Cabocla, Pai Herói, O Bem Amado, Guerra dos Sexos, Rabo de Saia, 
A Sucessora, Louco Amor, Corpo a Corpo, Vereda Tropical. 
3Roberto Carneiro is a former chairman of the private national TV channel, Televisão Independente de 
Comunicação, TVI. 
4RTP operated in monopoly until the 6th of October 1996, when the first national private channel, SIC, 
started broadcasting. On the 20th of February 1993, a second national TV channel, TVI went on the air. 
So, presently there are four national terrestrial TV channels: RTP 1, RTP 2, SIC and TVI. 
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With the break up of RTP's monopoly in 1992 and the subsequent ferocious 
battle for audiences, telenovelas became even more dominant in television 
programming. The demand was so intense that companies had to look for other content 
providers rather than Globo. TVI, for example, acquired novelas from Bandeirantes, 
Serviço Brasileiro de Televisão, TV Cultura (all Brazilian networks), Televisa (Mexico) 
and Venevision (Venezuela). In January 1995, TVI was programming three Venezuelan 
telenovelas (dubbed into Brazilian-Portuguese) per day and a Brazilian in prime time. 
Lacking financial5 and human resources, TVI could not compete with RTP and SIC in 
terms of getting Globo's products and/or technical support. 
Being more resourceful than TVI, RTP can afford Brazilian telenovelas which 
are perceived as having more quality. In RTP 1, RTP's generalist channel, telenovelas 
are indeed a constant presence. In January 1995, this channel was broadcasting two 
telenovelas in the morning, one in the afternoon and the most important telenovela 
(usually the most recent) around 8.30 pm. 
Brazilian telenovelas are the most important element of SIC's highly 
competitive strategy. It was due to telenovelas that SIC managed to overtake RTP 1 in 
terms of audiences, being today the most watched TV channel in the country. In January 
1995, for example, SIC started week days broadcasting at 11am with two Brazilian 
telenovelas . A third one was broadcasted in the afternoon continues. Another Brazilian 
telenovela  went on the air before the main news programme at 8pm whilst the fifth 
Brazilian telenovela  of the day was shown at 8.50. Great importance is given to the 
selection of the last telenovela. 
 In contrast with a number of Latin American countries, Portugal produces a 
very small number of series or movies, being therefore dependent on foreign products. 
Brazilian telenovelas in general, and those of Globo in particular, are crucial to the 
sustenance of bulky audiences. Telenovelas are the most watched television 
programmes. Watching telenovelas became clearly an ingrained habit of the Portuguese 
people. 
The cultural and social consequences of 20 years of telenovelas in Portuguese 
TV have not yet been studied. Nevertheless, a number of consequences are observable. 
A number of Brazilian expressions entered into people's vocabulary, Brazilian first 
names are widely used, novela's actors and actresses fashion accessories are imitated, 
Carnival is 'reproduced' in every town. There is also a common perception that Brazilian 
                                                 
5TVI has only 10% of the television advertising cake. 
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telenovelas had an important role in terms of liberalising behaviour, though there is no 
evidence to support that.  
 
A New Strategy for a New System 
In the 1990's, the influence of Globo in Portugal has spread to other spheres 
rather than the export of telenovelas. The opening up of the television market in the 
early 1990's provided Globo with an opportunity to gain a solid position in Portugal 
and, indeed, its strategy adapted to the new competitive environment. 
Once the Television Act (law nº58/90) was passed and the bidding regulations 
approved, on the 2nd April 1991, three Portuguese candidates applied for the two 
available national TV channels: the Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) led 
by the former prime-minister, Pinto Balsemão; TV1 Rede Independente, chaired by 
Proença de Carvalho with the support of the Carlos Barbosa media group (Presslivre), 
and Televisão Independente (TVI), close to the Catholic Church. Even before the results 
were publicly announced, Globo had invested in SIC the very maximum allowed by law 
for a foreign participation (15%). At that time, 15% of SIC's capital represented 
US$34m. Currently, as the companies' capital increased, 15% represents US$74m. 
Though SIC was an expected winner in the bidding process, investing capital in 
a Portuguese broadcasting company was not an easy decision for Globo's executives to 
make. For Globo, it has always been safer to export cultural products because, once 
investment had been recouped in the home market, selling telenovelas, mini-series and 
other shows could only mean extra-funds. Investing capital in a Portuguese broadcaster 
was inevitably a risky business. Licence-fee had been abolished and four national TV 
channels (RTP 1, RTP 2, SIC and TVI) were preparing themselves to fight for a small 
adverting cake (£160m) (in Sousa, 1996: introduction). The Portuguese television 
market was not a resourceful one. Additionally, in the early 1990's, the first (and by 
then only) European Globo's experience in terms of capital investment, Telemontecarlo, 
was already in serious trouble by early 1990's. Telemontecarlos had been, in fact, a 
poorly judged investment and investing capital in the Portuguese market was not in 
Roberto Marinho's plans. Not prepared to waist financial resources, Roberto Marinho 
(father) resisted to the idea for quite sometime. 
Still, Roberto Marinho's son, Roberto Irineu Marinho, responsible for the 
Audiovisual and new markets, and Pinto Balsemão himself, end up convincing Globo's 
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chairman that SIC would be a solid investment. Having failed with the first European 
market (Italy), Roberto Ireneu might have wanted to prove his father that successful 
investment in Europe was possible. 
Pinto Balsemão took this task of convincing the Brazilians personally and 
travelled to Rio de Janeiro to secure the investment and the technical/human support 
that SIC so badly needed. 'I was recently in Brazil and dr. Roberto Marinho offered in 
my honour a dinner in his home. Amongst the 30 guests were the most important Globo 
executives. I had meeting with these executives during two days and I discussed issues 
such as equipment, commercial difficulties and the profile of Globo's administrator in 
SIC's board' (Interview to O Independente, 24 May 1991). 
The personal relationship between Pinto Balsemão and Roberto Marinho was a 
determining factor in terms of Globo's investment in SIC. According to SIC's Marketing 
Director, Correia Pires, there are affinities between both which probably made their 
talks easier: 'both started their careers as journalists and both worked in newspapers; 
both developed multi-media strategies and, coincidentally, only when they were middle-
aged is that their first television experience was developed; furthermore, although in 
different forms, both have been involved in politics' (interview with author, 26 May 
1997). 
All efforts were made to convince Roberto Marinho because Globo was 
perceived by SIC's executives as an ideal strategic partner. Firstly, Globo has 'the' 
perfect products in terms of audiences, telenovelas; secondly, Globo has managerial and 
technical experience; thirdly, any help they could provide to SIC would not be impaired 
by linguistic barriers. In fact, following initial unsteady talks, the Marinho family 
reached a consensus and decided to invest financially and to provide technical help. 
Globo's backing was particularly important right after the disclosure of the 
winners of the television channels' bidding process. On the 6th of February 1992, after a 
Cabinet meeting, the ministro Marques Mendes, announced that SIC was attributed a 
national TV channel. From then up until the beginning of SIC's regular broadcasts, eight 
months later, Globo's expertise was crucial. Neither Balsemão nor, his right hand, 
Emídio Rangel, had any previous experience in television. Two thirds of newly 
recruited journalists have ever faced a camera and, in a country where RTP operated in 
monopoly, there were not too many places where SIC could recruit its technicians. 
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Being Globo - in SIC's executives eyes - a model commercial television, SIC's 
highest ranks travelled to Brazil in order to understand how Globo was organised and 
how it performed. Pinto Balsemão, President of the board, and Emídio Rangel, 
Programmes and Information Director, made their working trips to Globo. The 
Marketing Director and Commercial Director had also made professional internships in 
Globo. Moreover, Globo has a senior executive, Pedro Carvalho, in SIC's board. Pedro 
Carvalho is a man of confidence of Roberto Marinho and has a strong position in SIC. 
He is the Vice-President of the board and the Vice-President of the executive 
commission, right below Pinto Balsemão. Directly and indirectly, SIC's management 
strategy has been influenced by the Brazilians. SIC has very aggressive Marketing and 
Comercial departments, and, like Globo, its programming strategy is unconditionally 
designed to maximise audiences.  
Globo's technical department has also provided crucial know how to the newly 
created TV station. It has provided expertise in terms of selection of equipment and 
human resources. There has been a Trans-Atlantic movement: SIC's technicians have 
travelled to Brazil to develop their expertise and Globo's experts have come to Lisbon to 
provide their services in SIC's studios. Apart from engineering and the selection of 
human resources, Globo has also been very important in terms of defining SIC's image. 
SIC's logotype and image was developed by Globo's operative, Hans Donner. 
 Pinto Balsemão says that there is an 'intimate' relationship between Globo and 
SIC: 'They have given us plenty of advice, we tried to follow them and it has been very 
fruitful' (quoted in Sousa, 1996). To SIC's chairman, this privileged relationship is only 
natural since Globo is a share holder and it has a member sitting on SIC's administrative 
board. 
Globo's management strategy and technical expertise has, in fact, been 
essential to the setting up of SIC and to the development of winning tactics. But, it is 
still as a 'content provider' that Globo is most desired. Since the beginning of Globo's 
co-operation with SIC, its executives have always expressed their aspiration in having 
the exclusive of Globo's telenovelas. This was not an easy option for Globo because 
RTP had been, for many years, one of Globo's best clients and there has always been a 
courteous and professional relation between both companies. 
For two years, Globo sold telenovelas to both RTP and SIC. So, Globo's 
products were actually competing with each other during prime time and dividing 
audiences. SIC argued that this was not the best strategy for Globo itself as telenovelas 
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actors were over-exposed (often same actors were on the air simultaneously in two 
channels interpreting different roles). Basically, SIC high ranks argued that fragmenting 
audiences with Globo's own products was not sustainable in the long term. Firstly 
because telenovelas' image would suffer and, secondly, because Globo produces an 
average of nine novelas per annum, and - at present levels - that would not be enough 
for two channels (RTP 16 and SIC). Naturally, if Globo had to contribute to the 
commercial success of one channel only, this would be one where its investment was. 
In September 1994, after initial resistance, Globo signs a contract of exclusivity 
with SIC. This contract, which became effective in January 1995, was a very serious 
blow to RTP.  RTP's generalist channel (RTP 1) was already having problems to keep 
its audiences and the consequences of this contract were easily anticipated by RTP's 
Programme Direction. Indeed, by mid-1995, due to Globo's telenovelas, SIC became the 
most watched TV channel in the country (see annex 1). In 1996, the four most watched 
TV programmes amongst all Portuguese terrestrial channels, were four Globo's 
telenovelas exhibited by SIC (see annex 2). Clearly Globo's products have been key to 
SIC's success. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Portugal was a 'natural' market for Globo's television products and in the 
1970's the export of telenovelas  has started, though the dramatic increase of Brazilian 
fiction in Portugal took place right after the opening up of the Portuguese television 
market in 1992. For two decades, the PSB company's generalist channel, RTP 1, 
combined in prime-time news with a telenovela. As there were no competing companies 
at the time, telenovelas were very popular but broadcasted in 'moderate' quantities.  
After 1992, both public and commercial channels counted with telenovelas to develop 
their programming strategies. Globo's products, in particular, became essential in the 
audience battle. 
Exporting telenovelas to Portugal did not imply any financial risks. The 
product was not developed taking the Portuguese market into considerations and once 
investment had been recouped in the home market, selling telenovelas to RTP could 
                                                 
6Although RTP has two channels, only RTP 1 (the generalist channel) broadcasts Brazilian telenovelas. 
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only mean extra-funds. Still, in a competitive environment, Globo had to adapt its 
strategy and, more than selling cultural products, Globo got involved in a private 
television station. Globo has had a crucial role in the setting up of SIC and in the 
development of its managerial and programming strategies. 
Apart from the direct consequences of Globo in Portugal, a working hypothesis 
will be developed in ulterior research. It is quite possible that Globo's strategy might 
have had a considerable indirect consequence in the overall Portuguese television 
scenario. Having followed Globo's managerial 'advice', SIC became the number one in 
terms of audiences and the channel with minor financial losses. In these circumstances, 
the other channels, fiercely fighting for audiences and advertising revenues, believed 
that their best alternative would be to imitate SIC's model. 
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